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UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICEs-RoBINsoN-PATMAN Acr-PAYMENTS FOR AD-
VERTISING UNDER SECTIONS 2(d) AND 2(e)-Plaintiffs, wholesale and retail 
grocers, brought a class action for treble damages and injunctive reliefl-
under sections 2(d) and 2(e) of the Robinson-Patman Act.2 Defendant-
suppliers of defendant-A & P Co. had paid for advertising in Woman's 
Day, a magazine published by a wholly-owned subsidiary of A & P, without 
making a corresponding allowance available to plaintiffs who had no 
similar publication. The district court found no violation of section 2(e) 
since the suppliers were not contributing to the furnishing of a discrim-
inatory service within the meaning of that section.3 Because the adver-
tising was designed primarily to aid defendant-suppliers, with A & P glean-
ing only incidental benefits which also accrued to its competitors, there 
was also no granting of a payment upon proportionally unequal terms as 
prohibited by section 2(d).4 Moreover, since plaintiffs did not themselves 
1 As provided in 38 Stat. 731, 737 (1914), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §§15, 26. 
2 Amendatory of the Clayton Act, 49 Stat. 1527 (1936), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §13. 
3 Section 2(e) reads: "It shall be unlawful for any person to discriminate in favor 
of one purchaser against another purchaser or purchasers of a commodity bought for 
resale, with or without processing, by contracting to furnish or furnishing, or by con-
tributing to the furnishing of, any services or facilities connected with the processing, 
handling, sale, or offering for sale of such commodity so purchased upon terms not 
accorded to all purchasers on proportionally equal terms." 
4 Section 2(d) reads: "It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce to 
pay or contract for the payment of anything of value to or for the benefit of a customer 
of such person in the course of such commerce as compensation or in consideration for 
any services or facilities furnished by or through such customer in connection with the 
processing, handling, sale, or offering for sale of any products or commodities manufac-
tured, sold, or offered for sale by such person, unless such payment or consideration is 
available on proportionally equal terms to all other customers competing in the dis-
tribution of such products or commodities." 
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furnish similar services, they had no standing to complain of discrimination. 
On appeal, held, affirmed as to the section 2(e) ruling, reversed as to the 
section 2(d) ruling, one judge dissenting.5 To avoid violation of section 
2(d), defendant-suppliers needed to make payments available on propor-
tionally equal terms t'o other customers competing with A & P. Plaintiffs' 
failure to publish a magazine did not relieve defendants from liability. 
State Wholesale Grocers v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company, (7th Cir. 
1958) 258 F. (2d) 831. 
The rapidly increasing power of the great chain stores and a resultant 
fear for the welfare of the independant merchant6 gave rise to the Robin-
son-Patman Act which was aimed at curtailing unfair competition via price 
discrimination, both direct and indirect. The power of the chains was mak-
ing itself felt in terms of discriminatory rebates, services, and allowances 
granted them by their suppliers. The particular stimulus for the inclusion 
of sections 2(d) and 2(e) was the prevalence of advertising allowances and 
promotional services which enabled these organizations to shift a portion of 
their selling costs to the suppliers and thereby gain a competitive advan-
tage over their smaller rivals.7 Section 2(d) proscribes the granting by sup-
pliers of unequal or unproportionalized payments for services or facilities 
provided by customers competing with each other, while section 2(e) pro-
hibits the discriminatory furnishing of services or facilities to such com-
peting customers. The affirm.ance in the principal case of the finding of no 
violation of section 2(e) by defendant-suppliers appears correct. The mere 
purchasing of advertising space in the magazine would not reasonably 
seem to constitute the granting or furnishing of a "service" or "facility" 
to a purchaser within the purview of section 2(e).8 
The interpretation of section 2(d), however, causes more difficulty. 
While numerous problems have arisen from the attempted application of 
this section, the phrase "proportionally equal terms" has proved the most 
perplexing.9 Although the apparent purpose of these words was to prohibit 
5 The opinion does not disclose the basis of the dissent. 
6 See generally, S. Doc. 4, 74th Cong., 1st sess. (1934) FTC Final Report on the Chain 
Store Investigation; FELDMAN AND ZORN, 'ROBINSON-PATMAN Acr: ADVERTISING AND PROMO-
TIONAL AI.LowANCES·92 (1948); Rowe, "The Evolution of the Robinson-Patman Act: A 
Twenty-Year Perspective," 57 CoL. L. REv. 1059 (1957). 
7H. Rep. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d sess., pp. 15, 16 (1936). See also S. Rep. 1502, 74th 
Cong., 2d sess. (1936); 80 CONG. REc. 7759, 8123, 9418, 9561 (1936); FELDMAN AND ZORN, 
ROBINSON-PAT!IIAN Acr: ADVERTISING AND PROMOTIONAL .ALLOWANCES 91 (1948). 
8 See Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass Co., (8th Cir. 1945) 150 F. (2d) 988; 
American Can Co. v. Russellville Canning Co., (8th Cir. 1951) 191 F. (2d) 38; Chicago 
Seating Co. v. S. Karpen &: Bros., (7th Cir. 1949) 177 F. (2d) 863; In the Matter of Luxor, 
Ltd., FTC Dkt. 3736 (1940). See also, FELDMAN AND ZORN, ROBINSON-PAT!IIAN Acr: ADVERTIS• 
ING AND PROMOTIONAL ALLOWANCES 89, 139 (1948); Fisher, "Sections 2(d) and (e) of the 
Robinson-Patman Act: Babel Revisited,'' 11 VAND. L. REv. 453 at 481 ·(1958). 
9 Note that the discussion ,regarding §2(d) applies equally to the identical language 
of §2(e), as both have -been interpreted in the same way by the courts. 
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the favoring of certain customers through indirect means such as payments 
exceeding the worth of the service or facility provided, no legislative stand-
ard was provided by which compliance with the requirement was to be 
measured.10 The cases clearly indicate that either the furnishing of a pay-
ment which cannot be proportionalized so as to be made available to all 
competing customers, or the refusal to proportionalize the terms upon 
which payment is granted, is a failure to comply with the statute.11 In 
other words, a supplier cannot tailor a money grant so that only a few 
customers will be able to take advantage of it, even though it may be offered 
to all. Since the payment for advertising space in Woman's Day falls within 
this prohibition, the court concluded that failure of plaintiffs to publish 
a magazine did not relieve defendants from making some sort of allowance 
available to them. 
The objection to the decision in the principal case is not that it fails to 
follow existing precedent but, on the contrary, that it perpetuates the in-
terpretation of section 2(d) as a "per se" section; that is, violation of its 
terms is not excused by the fact that there has been no injury to competi-
tion even though such a defense is available in prosecutions under section 
2(a) of the act.12 The reasoning behind this interpretation is that the failure 
to make payments available on proportionally equal terms is in its nature 
discriminatory and, therefore, injurious to competition "per se." In addi-
tion, it has been suggested that the purpose of sections 2(d) and 2(e) was to 
prohibit accomplishing indirectly what cannot be done directly because of 
section 2(a).13 The difficulty of proof as to the injurious effects of discrimina-
tion under sections 2(d) and 2(e) has led to the belief that to allow this de-
fense would be ultimately to destroy the effectiveness of section 2(a). As has 
10 H. Rep. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d sess. (1936); S. Rep. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d sess. (1936); 
80 CONG. R.Ec. 3231, 9561 (1936); FELDMAN AND ZORN, ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT: ADVERTISING 
AND PROMOTIONAL ALLOWANCES 93 (1948); Fisher, "Sections 2(d) and (e) of the Robinson-
Patman Act: Babel ,Revisited," 11 VAND. L. REV. 453 at 468 (1958); Smith, "The Patman 
Act in Practice,'' 35 MICH. L. REV. 705 at 726 (1937}; FTC Dkt. 5226, 5243; comment, 46 
YALE L. J. 447 at 465 (1937). 
11 Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass Co., note 8 supra; American Can Co. v. 
Russellville Canning Co., note 8 supra. See also Russellville Canning Co. v. American 
Can Co., (W.D. Ark. 1949) 87 F. Supp. 484; 80 CONG. REC. 3231, 9416 (1936). But the 
terms offered need not be identical or tailored so that every purchaser can take advantage 
of every feature. See FTC Dkt. 5585-5587; AUSTIN, PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND RELATED 
PROBLEMS UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 136 (1950). 
12 E.g., Elizabeth Arden, Inc. v. FTC, (2d Cir. 1946) 156 F. (2d) 132, cert. den. 331 
U.S. 806 (1947); United Cigar-Whelan Stores Corp. v. H. Weinreich Co., (S.D. N.Y. 1952) 
107 F. Supp. 89. See also AUSTIN, PRICE DISCRllllINATION AND RELATED PROBLEMS UNDER 
THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 116 (1950); Greenberg, "Indirect Price Differences and the 
Robinson-Patman Act: Anomalies Compounded," 28 PA. B.A.Q. 265 (1957). Section 2(a) 
prohibits direct or indirect price discrimination between purchasers of like grade and 
quality which has an adverse effect on competition, and which cannot be justified on 
the basis of a cost saving. 
13 H. Rep. 2966, 84th Cong., 2d sess. (1956). 
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been pointed out in support of an amendment of these sections, however, 
the real aim of Congress was to eliminate unearned payments resulting in 
discrimination, not to disallow advantages gained pursuant to the rules of 
fair and open competition.14 The undesirable result that the courts reach 
under the present interpretation is well illustrated by the principal case. 
Defendants received full value for their payments, obtained the primary 
benefits of the advertising, and paid on the same terms as advertisers who 
did not deal with A & P as a customer.15 Yet the courts have determined 
that when a retail organization is paid a fair price for a service which only 
it is equipped to provide, and the supplier enters the transaction solely for 
his own legitimate business benefit, the transaction is nevertheless within 
the prohibition of section 2(d) because the retailer may also be benefited.16 
Surely this is a perversion of the purpose of the statute. In the interpreta-
tion of section 2(d), the courts have carried the operation of the act beyond 
its originally intended limits. The principal case, while in accord with the 
present state of the law, points up the need for a re-evaluation of the Rob-
inson-Patman Act in this area. 
Robert Segar 
14 Oppenheim, "Should the Robinson-Patman Act Be Amended?" N.Y. STATE BAR 
AssN., ROBINSON-PATMAN Acr SYMPOSIUM 142 (1948). See also Rowe, "Price Discrimination, 
Competition, and Confusion: Another Look at Robinson-Patman," 60 YALE L. J. 929 at 
959 (1951); LEVY, THE ROBINSON-PATMAN Acr-A YEAR'S RETROSPECT (1937). 
15 State Wholesale Grocers v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., (N.D. Ill. 1957) 154 
F. Supp. 471 at 497. 
16 There is a strong hint in •the legislative history •that the act was intended to cover 
this situation if the customer derives equal benefits to his own business. See H. Rep. 2287, 
74th Cong., 2d sess., p. 15 (1936); S. Rep. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d sess., p. 7 (1936). This was 
admittedly not true in the principal case. 
